

Recent Progress in US Nuclear Power Plant Safety

April 15, 2010


**Presentation for the LBNL
EETD (Env. Energy Technology Division) seminar series**

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104 U.S. nuclear power plants

U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors—Years of Operation



Years of Commercial Operation

- △ 0-9
- ▲ 10-19
- ▲ 20-29
- ▲ 30-39

Number of Reactors

- 0
- 10
- 42
- 52

Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Three questions **vis-à-vis nuclear power plants**

- o How is “safety” achieved?**
- o How is “safety” analyzed or measured?**
- o Why do we believe that safety has improved significantly in the last decade or so?**

What characterizes a “safe” nuclear power plant?

Answer: It is a plant whose probability (in a given year) of a major accident is “acceptably low”.

This raises a question – How “low” is “acceptably low”?

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The US NRC has given us guidance on this:

Core Damage Frequency \leq about 10^{-4} per year

Large Release Frequency \leq about 10^{-6} per year

Analyzing “safety”

This raises a second question -- How does one analyze CDF and LRF?

Answer: One requires a safety assessment, which intrinsically must be probabilistic, a so-called “PRA” (“probabilistic risk analysis”).

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Specifically:

- o Postulate every initiator, and determine its frequency
- o Work out the contingent probability of “core damage” given the initiator
- o Work out the consequences of each sequence

A major “problem”:

We have hardly any “accidents” to use for benchmarking.

[This is a triumph for engineering, but a “problem” for the analyst charged with figuring out what the (low) accident frequencies might be.]

How to measure the “safety” that is actually achieved?

- o Overall analysis of entire reactor (probabilistic)**
- o System-specific analysis**
- o Analysis of “precursors”**
- o Safety “indicators”**

In practice

- o Overall design
- o Quality of construction
- o Operations including human factors
- o Safety “culture” (including “continuous improvement”)
- o How does “continuous improvement” work in practice?

Safety Philosophy

- o Redundant systems**
- o Lots of “margin” in each engineering facet**
- o Well-trained operating crew**
- o Learning from experience (world-wide)**
- o No-fault reporting**


Next, look at the data

Significant Events at U.S. Nuclear Plants:

Annual Industry Average, Fiscal Year 1988-2006

Significant Events are those events that the NRC staff identifies for the Performance Indicator Program as meeting one or more of the following criteria:


- A Yellow or Red Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) finding or performance indicator
- An event with a Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) or increase in core damage probability (Δ CCDP) of 1×10^{-5} or higher
- An Abnormal Occurrence as defined by Management Directive 8.1, "Abnormal Occurrence Reporting Procedure"
- An event rated two or higher on the International Nuclear Event Scale




Source: NRC Information Digest, 1988 is the earliest year data is available.
Updated: 11/07

Budnitz note:
in 2006, the figure was 0.32 per plant
in 1985 it was 4.2
in 1980 it was 7.3


Automatic Scrams While Critical




Safety System Failures



Safety System Actuations



Forced Outage Rate (%)



Safety – What accounts for these trends?


- **Learning from experience**: industry-wide reporting system
 - Reporting everything to everybody, no fault
- **Analysis**: major effort to analyze each event for its causes, implications
- **Maintenance**: concentrating on the important things, design for easier maintenance
- **Operator errors**: simulator training, procedures
- **Industry-wide peer-to-peer inspection visits, task forces**
- **Design changes**: eliminating design flaws, a “forgiving” design
- **NRC**: Risk-informed enforcement actions (ignore minor events)

**Let's look at
industrial safety and costs**

U.S. Nuclear Industrial Safety Accident Rate

One-Year Industry Values


[Budnitz note: 1980 was 2.1, and 1990 was 1.1]



ISAR = Number of accidents resulting in lost work, restricted work, or fatalities per 200,000 worker hours.

Source: World Association of Nuclear Operators
Updated: 4/08


(Budnitz note: in 2006, the figure was 93 person-rem/plant)



Costs are dropping too

- **The cost of nuclear-produced electricity is dominated by the capital cost of building the reactor plant.**
- **For today's reactors, that is all sunk cost.**
- **Major change: The operating costs and fuel costs have been declining rapidly.**


U.S. Nuclear Refueling Outage Days Average



Source: 1990-98 EUCG, 1999-2007 Energy Velocity / Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Updated: 2/08

U.S. Nuclear Industry Capacity Factors 1971 - 2007



* Preliminary


Source: Global Energy Decisions / Energy Information Administration

Updated: 4/08



U.S. Electricity Production Costs

1995-2007, In 2007 cents per kilowatt-hour




Production Costs = Operations and Maintenance Costs + Fuel Costs



Source: Global Energy Decisions
Updated: 5/08

Monthly Fuel Cost to U.S. Electric Utilities

1995 – 2007, In 2007 cents per kilowatt-hour




Source: Global Energy Decisions

Updated: 5/08

Fuel as a Percentage of Electric Power Production Costs

2007



Safety -- Key Attributes

- o safety culture**
- o safety culture**
- o safety culture**

(trained crews, learning from experience, no-fault reporting, analysis, feedback from experience)

- o a "forgiving" design**

Security

- o against outside attack**
- o against insider sabotage**
- o against theft of nuclear material**